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Establishing a better balance in questions of discrimination by associations is an urgent
task to realize a well-functioning, truly inclusive pluralist society. While associations con-
tinue to claim exceptions from anti-discrimination law, membership in voluntary private
associations can provide access to goods that might considerably inﬂuence life chances.
Restrictive membership policies may thus conﬂict with anti-discrimination efforts of the
liberal democratic state. Upon critical examination, I ﬁnd that neither the current U.S. Su-
preme Court approach that protects a group’s explicit message, nor the alternative ap-
proach that would shield all predominantly expressive groups, adequately protects the im-
portant liberty, equality, and democracy interests at stake. I therefore propose a goods
approach that develops a more sophisticated conceptualization of associational goods by
devising three parameters to operationalize the harm caused by exclusion: their materiality,
availability, and valence. This avoids the stark dichotomy between extensive protection and
intrusive regulation of associations by introducing the option of decoupling goods from
membership, thereby offering a new logic for balance that allows all citizens a sufﬁcient
set of opportunities while not unduly restricting associational freedom of expression.
Keywords: freedom of association, discrimination, membership, equality, ﬁrst amend-
ment, pluralism
We currently seem to be once more engaged in a renegotiation of the properbalance between individual and associational speech rights and the nondis-
crimination interests of the liberal democratic state. In controversial decisions, the
U.S. Supreme Court recently struck down limitations on political speech rights of
corporations, and a “closely held for-proﬁt” corporation successfully claimed reli-
gious exemption from general health care provision laws.1 The Court appears split
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1. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). For a critical analysis see, e.g., David Ciepley, “Neither
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on a case it heard at the end of 2017 about the rights of a baker to refuse a homo-
sexual couple service on the basis of religious beliefs, with the decision in the case
pending.2
In the complex arena of private voluntary associations, this struggle between, on
the one hand, individual and group rights to expression and disagreement with so-
cietal norms, and on the other hand, the liberal democratic state’s authority to ensure
equal rights of public access for citizens has been fought particularly ﬁercely.3 Espe-
cially so-called secondary associations, meaning the vast array of social, cultural, re-
ligious, political, and sports clubs that are neither intimately private nor very public
and that require varying degrees of participation from theirmembers, have proven to
be a controversial category with respect to government anti-discrimination regula-
tion. The case that rang in the renewed debate concerning expressive and discrimi-
nation rights in the associational sphere was Boy Scouts of America v. Dale in 2000.
Here, the Court upheld a private voluntary association’s right to expel a gay scout-
master from its ranks because of his sexual orientation—a decision that sparked na-
tionwide controversy and led tomass exodus from the Boy Scouts.4Dale in this sense
marked the departure from earlier decisions that had tended to protect the state’s
anti-discrimination interests over the expressive rights of associations.5
Freedom of association is well understood to be one of the main pillars of lib-
eral democracy. Without a robust freedom to associate with whom one likes, free-
dom of expression, of opinion, of religion, and other fundamental liberties are
seriously threatened. Moreover, voluntary associations promise to allow citizens
2. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, No. 16-111.
3. The term “association” is of course an umbrella description for very disparate groups,
ranging from the family to large centralized lobby organizations that differ on a number of di-
mensions, such as purpose, size, hierarchy, cohesion, and nature of activity. In the following, the
terms association, organization, club, and group will be used not as terms of art but interchange-
ably. The present article concentrates on so-called secondary associations as distinguished from
primary intimate groups and tertiary quasi-public organizations. For more on this taxonomy,
see Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 48–53; also Amy Gut-
mann, “Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay,” in Freedom of Association (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 3–32, at 10.
4. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), at http://scoutingnewsroom.org/wp
-content/uploads/2015/05/DR-GATES-REMARKS.pdf.
5. Notably Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Board of Directors of Rotary
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); and New York State Club Associ-
ation v. New York City, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
Persons nor Associations,” Journal of Law and Courts 1 (2013): 221–45; Ira Lupu “Hobby Lobby
and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions,” Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 38
(2015): 35–102.
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to form opinions sheltered frommajoritarian pressures, build self-esteem, and stave
off threats of anomie in what can seem like an increasingly dispersed mass society.6
Even short of understanding associations as potential “panacea for all the main ill-
nesses of modern society,”7 it is clear that ﬁnding and protecting the right balance
between associational rights and egalitarian concerns is of crucial importance for
the proper functioning of a pluralist liberal democracy.
However, as associations continue to claim exceptions from anti-discrimination
law, we need clariﬁcation as to what kind of groups should have a right to discrim-
inate, the extent of permissible discrimination, and the normative grounds upon
which such discrimination rests. One crucial question in this context is whether
associations should be allowed to restrict their membership, and thereby access
to the opportunities they offer, on the basis of problematic criteria like race, gender,
or sexual orientation. Membership in associations often comes with access to im-
portant goods, such as eligibility for jobs, the use of land, ﬁnancial support, or skills
and training that are also valuable outside the association. Discriminatory exclu-
sion frommembership can therefore undermine the state’s efforts to guarantee fair
access to opportunities and material resources required for meaningful freedom
and democratic equality. Whenever associations pursue discriminatory policies,
the liberal democratic state is faced with having to balance its commitment to equal
citizenship and its promise of civic freedom.
The current U.S. legal approach and much of scholarly discussion seem to have
largely settled on a defense of “expressive exclusion” via the so-called message ap-
proach, which allows membership discrimination only when it is part of a group’s
explicit message.8 The only discussed alternative also focuses on expression as the
sole grounds for protection, but proposes to decide on the basis of the primary na-
ture of an association, so that groups whose activities are deemed to be predomi-
nantly expressive would be exempt from government intervention in membership
policies while those that are considered primarily commercial would be regulated.
As will be discussed, both approaches seek to shield associational expression over
other features in order to enable democratic dissent.
6. For example, see Robert Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,”
Journal of Democracy 6 (1995): 65–78, for a critical discussion of Simone Chambers and Jeffrey
Kopstein, “Bad Civil Society,” Political Theory 29 (2001): 837–65.
7. Yael Tamir, “Revisiting the Civic Sphere,” in Freedom of Association, ed. Gutmann, 214–
38, at 214 (see note 3 above).
8. Sonu Bedi, “Expressive Exclusion: A Defense,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010): 427–
40, emphasis added.
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In this article, I argue that both existing accounts fail to properly safeguard dissent
and that the focus on expressive association falls short of achieving a good balance
between protecting both the liberty and the equality interests at stake in associational
membership questions. As an alternative, I propose what I term a goods-based ac-
count that builds on a more sophisticated theorization of the associational goods
at stake in membership discrimination, and introduces the possibility of decoupling
certain goods frommembership to allow both access and the preservation of associ-
ational voice. In this way, I will argue, a new and better balance between egalitarian
and liberty interests can be achieved, providing all citizens with a sufﬁcient set of op-
portunities while not unduly restricting associational freedom of expression. To this
end, the article will proceed as follows. In the ﬁrst part, I outline the logic of the mes-
sage approach and discuss how it fails, both conceptually and as it is applied by the
courts, to adequately protect the associational ability to voice dissent, while also risk-
ing to neglect legitimate state goals of ensuring equal citizenship conditions. I also
critique the alternative “primary nature” account on the same terms. In the second
part, I propose a conceptualization of the associational goods at stake inmembership
exclusion and develop three parameters—namely materiality, availability, and va-
lence—that help operationalize what these goods are and what harm exclusion from
them causes. On the basis of this conceptualization, I discuss when, from a goods-
based perspective, full membership should still be compelled, and when decoupling
may be amore equitable alternative, also taking into account the particular needs and
rights of children.
Shielding Expressive Association
Freedom of association is intuitively a fundamental part of enjoying personal free-
dom, since “picking one’s company is part of living as one likes; living as one likes
(provided one does not injure the claims of others) is what being free means.”9
However, freedom of association, not expressly granted in the U.S. Constitution
but by now legally well-established through a number of cases tried before the
Supreme Court, is neither scholarly nor legally defended primarily on intrinsic
grounds. An appreciation of its intrinsic value provides very little guidance with
respect to the appropriate limits of associational freedom—especially in the ques-
tion of membership discrimination. Rather, the scope of associational freedom is
9. George Kateb, “The Value of Association,” in Freedom of Association, ed. Gutmann, 35–
63, at 36 (see note 3 above).
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usually negotiated with the many instrumental uses in mind that associations may
have for democracy.10 Functioning as a sort of school of democracy, associations pur-
portedly allow members to interact in a way that fosters the virtues of “justice and
fairness, ﬁdelity and trust, integrity and impartiality,” an effect that John Rawls de-
scribes as the “morality of association.”11 While the assumption of a necessarily pos-
itive socializing effect of associational life has been criticized empirically12 and theo-
retically,13 there remain “personal uses”14 of associations for members that might
nevertheless help stabilize mass democracies. By acting as counterweights to trends
of social disintegration and personal anomie, associations, irrespective of their inter-
nal workings and teachings, may be beneﬁcial to individuals in that they provide
them with a stable social environment.
Themost common and legally supported defense of associational freedom against
equality claims rests on the assertion that it protects the necessary pluralism of opin-
ions and choices that have to be open to citizens in their capacity as private persons,
but also as political decisionmakers. By letting people associate and dissociate as they
wish, the resulting associational sphere expresses what Rawls describes as the “plu-
rality of conﬂicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the meaning,
value and purpose of human life.”15 Voluntary associations thus represent “anti-
hegemonic domains”16 that not only help shield minority views from majoritarian
pressures, but also hinder the government from abridging pluralism by actively
10. There exists a “remarkable consensus” about the function that a vibrant and pluralistic
associational life plays for democracy among the various strands of democratic theory; see Mark
Warren, Democracy and Association (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 3. War-
ren surveys the thought of civic republican theorists, American pluralists, liberals, critical the-
orists, and as associative democrats, which all praise associational life for the role it plays in
collective self-government, albeit with different emphases, at 3–38.
11. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Belknap Press,
1999), 413.
12. For example, see Tom Van Der Meer and Erik Van Ingen, “Schools of Democracy? Dis-
entangling the Relationship between Civic Participation and Political Action in 17 European
Countries,” European Journal of Political Research 48 (2009): 281–308. See also Sheri Berman,
“Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” World Politics 49 (1997): 401–29.
13. For example, see Chambers and Kopstein, “Bad Civil Society” (see note 6 above).
14. Nancy Rosenblum, Membership and Morals (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1998).
15. John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Af-
fairs 14 (1985): 223–51, at 225.
16. Robert Post, “Law and Cultural Conﬂict,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 78 (2003): 485–508,
at 504.
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imposing values supportive of its own power and stability.17 Defending group life
rather than only individual freedom of expression is necessary to supply individu-
als not only with the opportunity to form an opinion but also with the essential or-
ganizational tools to develop an effective social and political voice. The hope is that
a diverse associational landscape will permit “ﬂuid pluralism,” allowing citizens to
change group attachments according to their evolving civic selves and to offset any
potential harm of rejection they experience from one group by joining another.18
However, while there is clearly a strong liberty interest at stake in negotiating
the limits of associational freedom, an appreciation of the instrumental uses of as-
sociations for democracy does not logically entail any clear position on anti-
discrimination questions. After all, associations may actually better foster demo-
cratic practices and virtues among their members if the state regulates membership
according to the standard of democratic equality.19 Given the strong state interest
in protecting civic equality, scholarly discussion and legal doctrine have concen-
trated on trying to extract which elements of associations need to be shielded from
government regulation to ensure their instrumental functions. In the question of
membership discrimination, a balance must be found between a “pure theory” of
freedom of association that “holds that, what individual persons are free to do sin-
gly, they ought to be free to do in association with one another,” and a “logic of
congruence” that seeks to impose complete conformity with the liberal state’s anti-
discrimination values in order to prevent associational life from undermining civic
equality by sheltering discriminatory practices.20
Associational freedom of expression is what both the conventional approach,
ﬁrst articulated in the legal realm by Justice Brennan in Roberts v. United States Jay-
cees, and the only discussed alternative account, associated with Justice O’Connor’s
17. Yael Tamir describes how government interference in associational life, be it through
direct control or indirect funding, can lead to imprinting politically backed values onto the civic
sphere, hampering non-partisan expressions of pluralism: “The civic sphere might then end up,
as it did in Israel, as a reﬂection of the political map, where most associations―from charity
organizations to soccer clubs―are divided among partisan lines” because “the government is
likely to support its own interpretations, values, and policies,” and neglect opposing world views.
See “Revisiting the Civic Sphere,” 224 (see note 7 above).
18. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, 85; see also 59–61 (see note 14 above).
19. For a discussion of possible state regulation to enhance democratic functions and sup-
press anti-democratic tendencies, see, e.g., Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, “Secondary Associ-
ations and Democratic Governance,” in their Associations and Democracy (London: Verso,
1995), 7–98. See also Warren, Democracy and Association (see note 10 above).
20. Jacob Levy, Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press,
2015), 42; see also 51–53. See Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, 36, for a discussion of the
logic of congruence (see note 14 above).
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dissenting opinion in the same landmark case, settled on, in two different ver-
sions. The conventional approach argues that membership discrimination should
be allowed if forced inclusion would alter a speciﬁc associational message. The al-
ternative account argues that certain kinds of associations whose activities are pre-
dominantly expressive should be shielded altogether from state regulation of mem-
bership policies. Both approaches thus focus on expressive discrimination as the
sole exemption because it plays a crucial role in “shielding dissident expression
from suppression by the majority.”21 Both, I will argue, fail to safeguard what they
deem most worthy of protection, the associational capacity to enable democratically
vital dissent.
The Message Approach: The Logic of “Expressive Exclusion”
In the conventional message approach, discriminatory membership policies may
be tolerated when the contested exclusion is integral to an associational message.
In order to ascertain that this is the case, in the landmark case of Roberts v. United
States Jaycees (1984), Justice Brennan proposed to apply a “nexus test” inmatters of
membership discrimination that scrutinizes whether there is a clear connection be-
tween the content of an alleged associational message and the exclusion of the con-
troversial group. Associations wishing to discriminate in their membership thus
have to demonstrate the existence of a message, and prove that this message would
become distorted as a result of the compelled inclusion of an unwanted category of
members. If such a nexus is established, the court then has to balance the impor-
tance of preserving the associational message against the legitimacy and urgency
of the state goal pursued.22 In Roberts, the Jaycees, an all-male membership civic
organization geared toward the economic advancement and leadership training
of young men, was prohibited from excluding women from full membership
with the argument that such inclusion would not abridge any discernible associa-
tional message.23 Following the Roberts decision, several voluntary associations
that wished to discriminate in membership also lost in court for failing to prove
message distortion.24
As Sonu Bedi retraced, the normative defense of the message approach relies
on a principle of “expressive exclusion,” which “seeks to endow certain groups
21. Brennan in Roberts, at 622 (see note 5 above).
22. To impede undue restriction of speech, the state goal must be compelling, must use
the least restrictive means possible, and, importantly, must not be aimed at the suppression of
speech. See ibid., 623–29.
23. Ibid., 627–28.
24. Rotary and New York State Club Association (for both cases, see note 5 above).
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with the ability . . . to question the value of a particular law.”25 It allows a range of
associations (religious and non-religious, voluntary associations, universities) to
discriminate on otherwise suspect grounds only when and because it is “essential
in creating genuine space for democratic dissent.”26 The logic of the focus on ex-
plicit message over other associational features thus becomes clear: “It is precisely
because the association sends a robust message that permits them to exclude on
otherwise prohibited grounds. Otherwise, we—those not in the association—
would not gain from the exclusion. With no public message, the exclusion does
not contribute to the marketplace of ideas.”27
Defenders of the message approach thus insist on standards that an associa-
tional message has to meet to qualify for protection. Justice Stevens—writing
for a dissenting minority in Dale, the case that allowed the Boy Scouts to expel
an openly gay scout leader—demanded that: “at a minimum, a group seeking
to prevail over an anti-discrimination law must adhere to a clear and unequivocal
view.”28 To be democratically relevant, such clear messages must also arguably be
discernible to the public. Developing this logic further, Jennifer Gerarda Brown
underlines the importance of publicity and pre-existence as requirements and
suggests that in order to be eligible for exemption, associations should ideally
be forced to publicly register in which respects they intend to deviate from the
prevailing anti-discrimination statutes. With the help of such an “Informed As-
sociation Statute,” messages expressed by membership choices would be readily
usable for public reaction and discourse, and future members forewarned about
the discriminatory practices of their chosen association. Associations and their
members would have to “come to terms with their own acts of discrimination”29
upon founding or joining. No one could claim ignorance about supporting dis-
criminatory messages, but neither would anyone have to endure a rough awak-
ening like the one that presumably was at the root of the drop in membership after
25. Bedi, “Expressive Exclusion,” 439 (see note 8 above).
26. Ibid., 428. Bedi thus shows that the principle of expressive exclusion grants exemption
not on the basis of religious accommodation, or of freedom of speech or association more gen-
erally, but out of a democratic impetus that seeks to shield that range of associations whose dis-
sent can be accommodated without undermining relevant law. Hence, it applies most directly to
secondary voluntary associations.
27. Ibid., 437.
28. Dale, at 676; emphasis added (see note 4 above).
29. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, “Facilitating Boycotts of Discriminatory Organizations Through
an Informed Association Statute,” Minnesota Law Review 87 (2002): 481–509, at 484.
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Dale clariﬁed and publicized the Boy Scouts of America’s opposition to gay scouts
and scoutmasters.30
Silence, then, and ambiguity where the exclusion of contested groups is con-
cerned, are not protected by the logic of expressive exclusion. Associations must
explicitly admit to their rejection of excluded groups in order to be eligible for pro-
tection. Mute resistance to ideals of civic equality does not contribute to the demo-
cratically productivemarket of ideas. Forcing associations to publicly announce their
discrimination strategies in order to be exempt is thus meant to oblige them to enter
their (now crystallized) message into the fray of public opinion and contestation.
Only then is expressive exclusion deemed to be conducive to democratic negotiation,
and anti-discrimination legislation kept safe from corrosion at the hands of private
voluntary associations.
Even when membership exclusion is deemed to be part of a discernible asso-
ciational message, it is not certain how the Court would balance between truly
competing claims of equality vs. associational expression. In Roberts and a follow-
ing case, no nexus between membership composition and message and no poten-
tial message distortion were recognized, and thus no meaningful balancing was
necessary. In Roberts, the Court found that to admit that the Jaycees’ viewpoints
would be changed by admitting women as full members was to agree with sexual
stereotyping and, as a result, it declined to acknowledge the nexus.31 In Rotary, it
offered that the club’s aims would be even better achieved by allowing women as
members, contrary to the association’s own beliefs.32 Without any message in
peril of being altered by compelling membership, the state interest could carry
the day without the need for balancing. In Dale on the other hand, when adju-
dicating whether or not the Boy Scouts of America could exclude a homosexual
scout leader, the Court accepted the existence of a nexus, opting for a strategy of
30. Ibid., 494.
31. “. . . we decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee’s contention
that, by allowing women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change the content or
impact of the organization’s speech”; see Roberts, 628 (see note 5 above). While Brennan did
examine whether the state goal was compelling (see 623–26), he concluded that “in any event”
the act did not impact much on the Jaycees’ speech (628). For a discussion of this point, see also
Seana Shiffrin, “What is Really Wrong with Compelled Association,” Northwestern Law Review
99 (2005): 839–88, at 843.
32. “. . . the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect
in any signiﬁcant way the existing members’ ability to carry out their various purposes. . . . In-
deed, by opening membership to leading business and professional women in the community,
Rotary Clubs are likely to obtain a more representative cross section of community leaders with
a broadened capacity for service”; see Rotary, 538–49 (see note 5 above).
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double-deference. It deferred to both the Boy Scouts of America’s understanding
of its own message and its assertion about which kind of membership compo-
sition would interfere with said message.33 However, the Court again did not
have to engage in balancing because in this case it dismissed the state’s anti-
discrimination interest in one sentence.34 “Balance” in the message approach so
far thus seems to hinge mostly on the nexus test, however it is interpreted by
the Court—if the claim of message distortion is accepted, associations can opt
out of anti-discrimination regulation. Otherwise, the state interest prevails.
Failing to Protect Democratic Dissent
Allowing expressive exclusion on the basis of message fails to adequately protect
liberty, equality, and democratic interests at stake on two accounts. First, it risks
at once being over- and under-protective of associational freedom with respect
to its conﬂict with legitimate egalitarian state goals because of the instability inher-
ent in the nexus test, revealing a problem of application.35 Second, andmore damn-
ingly, by shielding explicit message over other features of associations, it very likely
fails to protect what it sets out to safeguard: the ability to form and express dem-
ocratically valuable dissent. This reveals a more fundamental conceptual problem.
The difference in application of the nexus test between Roberts and Dale shows
that deciding from the outside what exactly the content of amessage is and whether
or not it necessitates exclusive membership is difﬁcult. It leaves much discretion to
courts to impose their reading on the validity of a message, a weakness that under-
mines the message approach’s aim of safeguarding essential democratic dissent—
especially since judges, as everyone else, are subject to conﬁrmation bias.36 Associ-
ations have to fear interference for the lack of a clear and public message, or, if they
have expressed one, for the possibility of different interpretations of the tolerable
degree of abridgment of that message, depending on how the Court chooses to as-
33. “It is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s expressed values because they disagree
with those values or ﬁnd them internally inconsistent. . . . We accept the Boy Scouts’ assertion
[that the code to be morally straight and clean is incompatible with homosexual conduct]. We
need not inquire further to determine the nature of the Boy Scouts’ expression with respect to
homosexuality”; see Dale, 651 (see note 4 above). “As we give deference to an association’s as-
sertions regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association’s
view of what would impair its expression” (ibid., 653).
34. Ibid., 659.
35. Lacunae that O’Connor already noted in her concurrent opinion in Roberts, 632 (see
note 5 above).
36. See Dale Carpenter, “Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A
Tripartite Approach,” Minnesota Law Review 85 (2001): 1515–89, at 1546.
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certain nexus. If, as happened in Dale, judges lean toward generously reading as-
sociational message, too complete a shelter might be given to discriminatory
groups that defy valid goals pursued by the state.37 As Seana Shiffrin remarked, ap-
plied like this, it is “unclear how an association run by reasonably intelligent people
could ever fail this test.”38 Of course, as argued above, the costs of discrimination go
up, because unpopular opinions will be shamed once they are widely known, as
happened to the Boy Scouts after Dale. However, depending on the reigning cul-
tural consensus on what kinds of discrimination are shameful, the exclusion of un-
wanted groups might be quite pervasive.
More fundamentally, however, the wish to force clear stances ex ante on socially
contentious issues is comprehensible in order to advance social change, but risks in
its forced either/or choice to limit expressive freedom too much for it to yield its
democratically beneﬁcial effects. Only openly fanatic associations will be reliably
protected, which creates a perverse incentive for clubs to become vocal on certain
issues that have traditionally motivated state regulation, and to replace ambivalent
and open-ended internal policies, by way of precaution, with more retrograde and
exclusionary ones, thus hampering internal disagreement and potential evolu-
tion.39 For expressive exclusion to play a role in the political negotiation of norms
and practices, true dissent must be allowed to develop. Forcing groups to pick a side
on sensitive issues in order to claim exemption might make it very costly indeed to
hold opinions that are out of favor. From the perspective of wishing to enable dem-
ocratic dissent such a standard risks being too stringent. Messages do not come
about out of thin air, and unpopular ones in particular presumably need a resilient
social basis to persist in the face of potential public backlash. Giving room to dis-
sent might have to begin at allowing that all groups can potentially become expres-
sive and eventually emit messages, even those that do not originally form for this
purpose. As issues arise, hitherto non-expressive groups might proceed to express
the distinctive voice that they previously merely embodied. Others might modify
their stances on issues over time, start commenting on new questions, or go silent
for a time or altogether. Interference with membership policy thus becomes espe-
37. Justice Stevens expressed this concern in his dissent in Dale: “This is an astounding view
of the law. I am unaware of any previous instance in which our analysis of the scope of a con-
stitutional right was determined by looking at what a litigant asserts in his or her brief and in-
quiring no further,” at 686 (see note 4 above).
38. Shiffrin, “What is Really Wrong,” 848 (see note 31 above).
39. See Madhavi Sunder, “Cultural Dissent,” Stanford Law Review 54 (2001): 495–567.
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cially problematic, because even if compelled integration of unwanted members
does not alter existing messages, it nevertheless changes the face and voice of the
association, and with this, potentially the content of futuremessages.40 Shiffrin goes
so far as to liken compelled membership to “mind control,” because the psycholog-
ical effect of even forced association can be identiﬁcation and sympathy with the
imposed members; at the very least it renders general, often abstract rejection per-
sonal.41 But if close association with unwanted members inevitably changes one’s
attitude toward them―an effect that is clearly also intended by anti-discrimination
legislation, in addition to counteracting the harm done to the excluded group of
persons—compellingmembership, unless there is a strong pre-establishedmessage
against the unwantedmembers, risks undermining the very basis onwhich the nor-
mative argument for an associational right to discriminate rests. Expressive exclu-
sion, in its function to safeguard democratic dissent and allow for the development
and defense of unpopular opinions, would be largely impeded at its source. Com-
pelled change of membership composition is then a forced alteration of the nature
of associations. They are rendered “artifacts,”42 and fall short of their democratic
function and potential to allow and express social pluralism.
The Primary Nature Approach: A Viable Alternative?
Given these problems of the message-based approach, some scholars favor Justice
O’Connor’s approach as offered in her concurring opinion in Roberts.43 She sug-
gested that groups should be protected on the basis of the predominant nature of
their activities rather than their explicit message content. Non-intimate associa-
tions should be divided into primarily expressive and non-expressive groups, the
latter ones subsumed under the label of “commercial” associations. If an association
is dealing with ideas, opinions, and views, and has as one of its primary purposes
40. Rosenblum makes this argument in her Membership and Morals; see, e.g., 205–11 (see
note 14 above).
41. Shiffrin, “What is Really Wrong,” 874 (see note 31 above). Carpenter describes this ef-
fect using the example of homosexual members in associations: “A heterosexual may make ab-
stract arguments supporting a gay equality claim and debate may ensue. But the moment a
known gay person enters the room abstractions end. An openly gay person forces those around
him to deal with their feelings about homosexuality in a much more personal way. The dispu-
tants confront a person, not just an argument. . . . Arguments about civil rights laws become
discussions about whether this person should be ﬁred or excluded. The whole dynamic changes
when an openly gay person is present.” See Carpenter, “Expressive Association,” 1554 (see
note 36 above).
42. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, 41 (see note 14 above).
43. E.g., Mark Warren, Democracy and Association, 102 (see note 10 above).
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the dissemination of viewpoints andmessages, it should be understood as predom-
inantly expressive and enjoy protection from state intervention in membership
questions. If, however, an association deals to an important degree in the realm of
material goods, it should be classed as commercial, and should be subject to state
regulation to ensure equal access to its goods.44
Accordingly, no examination of potential distortional effects of state regula-
tion is needed, for no regulation can be justiﬁed if the association is of expressive
character. Instead, the difﬁculty lies in appropriately classifying the plethora of
secondary voluntary associations as predominantly expressive or commercial. This
categorization is complex, for unlike message, expression might be indirect and
discreet, channeling worldviews through other activities. Not only can a “broad
range of activities [. . .] be expressive,” a variety of activities can also fall into either
category, depending on the context they are performed in.45 And no association,
no matter how expressive in nature, can eschew entirely the realm of commercial
dealings. Even an ideal type advocacy group will have to “collect dues from . . .
members or purchase printing materials or rent lecture halls or serve coffee and
cakes at its meetings.”46
The question arises therefore at what point commercial activities can cause
clubs to forfeit their status as predominantly expressive. The “substantial degree”
prescribed by O’Connor is by no means a clear standard;47 the classiﬁcation of
associations cannot but remain “ﬂuid and somewhat uncertain,” especially when
it comes to difﬁcult cases such as fraternities or cultural clubs.48 O’Connor ac-
knowledged this problem, but asserted that the complicated task of differentiating
between similar situations is neither avoidable nor unknown to courts, citing cases
in which the Supreme Court had to arbitrate similarly difﬁcult questions about the
principal nature of associations.49
Like the message approach, however, with which it shares the fundamental
justiﬁcation of safeguarding democratic pluralism, this alternative account also
risks at once over- and under-protecting freedom of association and thus of run-
ning afoul of both liberty and equality interests at stake. Allowing only minimal
protection for associations found―at the time of conﬂict―to be primarily com-
mercial risks stiﬂing potential future messages of groups that might not yet be
44. Roberts, 635–36 (see note 5 above).
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primarily expressive. Deciding on the basis of primary nature ultimately retains
the same “pinched understanding of associational voice”50 that also prevents the
message approach from adequately protecting democratic dissent.
More alarmingly, expansively protecting expressive associations can under-
mine the state’s egalitarian goals. This last concern is especially worrisome, as
the foundational distinction between primarily commercial and primarily expres-
sive associations seems inherently “very unstable.”51 If the distinction erodes and
more and more associations have a claim to comprehensive protection as expres-
sive associations, Andrew Koppelman warns that it “is hard to keep the logic of
the argument from reaching the Civil Rights Act.”52 And indeed, views like that
expressed by Richard Epstein, who on this logic thinks that only organizations
holding any kind of monopoly should be regulated, risk allowing society to slip
back into segregating practices.53 While protecting associations especially with
respect to their capacity for expression is necessary, it cannot go as far as to un-
dermine crucial state policies ensuring democratic equality. The primary nature
approach as well as the message approach thus seem inadequate to reliably safe-
guard necessary democratic dissent while defending important equality goals at
the same time.
A Goods-Based Approach
These difﬁculties suggest that the perspective underlying both approaches—pro-
tecting expression against equality claims—is what lies at the heart of the problem.
Allowing membership discrimination only as part of expressive activity, be it as di-
rect message or primarily expressive nature, reveals a conception of the values of
liberty and equality that puts them in strong competition. The options allowed
50. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, 204; emphasis added (see note 14 above).
51. Samuel Bagenstos, “The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations
Law,” Stanford Law Review 66 (2014): 1205–40, at 1228; see also 1220, 1228–32.
52. Andrew Koppelman, “Should Noncommercial Associations Have an Absolute Right to
Discriminate?” Law and Contemporary Problems 67 (2004): 27–57, at 42. In addition, any ex-
aggerated trust in the auto-corrective powers of the associational market should be resisted.While
a lively associational sphere certainly can often offer the excluded other alternatives and put in-
dividual associations under pressure to go with the times in order not to lose too many members,
the history of anti-discrimination efforts suggests that without state interventionmany egalitarian
goals will not, or only much later, come about. For a discussion of this point, see ibid., 43.
53. Richard Epstein, “The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts,”
Southern California Law Review 74 (November 2000): 119–43, at 120–22. See also his article,
“Public Accommodations under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why Freedom of Association
Counts as a Human Right,” Stanford Law Review 66 (2014): 1241–91.
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are either full inclusion, presumably opening up all associational goods that come
with membership to the new members also, or full exclusion, legitimized by the
democratic need to protect even potentially hurtful opinions since the “majority
could have gotten it wrong.”54 Balancing, in Brennan’s test and the logic of expres-
sive exclusion, is weighing claims and awarding one side the “win.” I propose that a
turn to differentiating among various associational goods for redistribution—rather
than conceiving of associational goods as consisting simply in full membership—
may offer an alternative in dealing withmembership questions that is more success-
ful at protecting both liberty and equality interests involved.
The fundamental assertion is that if vital egalitarian goals are at stake we should
refrain from shielding any association completely, even those that have a message
or are considered primarily expressive. In view of the crucial importance of asso-
ciational freedom of expression for democratic dissent—but arguably also for its
own sake with respect to the intrinsic value of freedom of association—we should,
however, also not force associations to accept unwanted categories of members un-
less absolutely necessary for egalitarian purposes. The key to reconceiving of the
balance between equality and liberty interests should therefore be to develop a
more sophisticated understanding of the associational goods withheld from non-
members, and to introduce a middle option of decoupling access to certain associ-
ational goods from full membership, rather than to deal out either compelled full
membership or absolute exclusion. This is not to say that some cases may not war-
rant allowing full exclusion or compelling full inclusion if either the liberty or the
equality interest is found to be paramount. But in the majority of cases, developing
a range of possible government interventions by relying on a more reﬁned theori-
zation of the categories of goods at stake and their relationship to citizenship status
of those excluded may allow us to ﬁnd a compromise that is respectful of both in-
terests. Balancing in the goods approach, then, describes a process which aims at
achieving an equilibrium and reconciliation between the claims. It thus is better
able to create and support a truly ﬂuid pluralism, which ismuch lauded as a support
for liberal democracy but is dependent on all citizens having access to the necessary
resources to exercise their rights and freedoms.
The Range of Associational Goods
The most important question for the goods approach is then, of course, which
kinds of goods groups offer their members, and which of them may warrant state
54. Bedi, “Expressive Exclusion,” 438 (see note 8 above).
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intervention and of what kind. Given the importance of some associational goods
for the realization of life chances, we should understand them as a subset of what
Rawls termed “primary social goods”: goods that rational individuals want because
with “more of these goods men can generally be assured of greater success in car-
rying out their intention and in advancing their ends, whatever these ends may
be.”55 As Stuart White has analyzed, associational goods might affect three kinds
of individual interests that fall under the heading of primary social goods in this
sense: “economic opportunity interests,” “community participation interests,” and
“integrity interests.”56 Membership in associations can inﬂuence chances of acquir-
ing income and wealth, and other opportunities that improve one’s chances to re-
alize one’s life plans and ethical commitments. It can also represent an important
opportunity to participate in the life of the community, especially if a club occupies
a prevalent place in the larger community. Finally, associational life is a resource for
a person’s “freedom to shape and live authentically in accordance with a distinctive
ethical personality,” an important but for our purposes ambivalent interest that
can lend legitimacy to claims both of inclusion and dissociation.57 Understanding
the interests at stake helps us identify the different possible motivations for regu-
lation of membership chances.
However, economic opportunity interests can involve many possible opportu-
nities of varying importance; not all clubs are prevalent enough in the wider com-
munity life for exclusion to impact on community participation interests; and in-
tegrity interests are held by both those seeking to become members as well as those
seeking to exclude unwanted company. In order to allow for an equitable distribu-
tion of associational goods, we need to operationalize these interests andmap them
onto the range of distinguishable associational goods and practices. To this end, I
suggest we classify associational goods with the help of three parameters: their ma-
teriality, availability, and valence. Differentiating among speciﬁc associational goods
according to these parameters allows us to determine what kinds of goods particular
associations offer, what harm exclusion from them causes with respect to the differ-
ent interests at stake, and, if intervention is found to be warranted, whether decou-
pling could be the most equitable solution that respects the interests of all involved.
55. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 79 (see note 11 above).
56. I borrow the terminology, in slightly adapted form, from his useful analysis of the basic
interests involved in associational life and membership exclusion, in “Freedom of Association
and the Right to Exclude,” Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (1997): 373–91, at 378, 382–84.
57. Ibid., 378.
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The ﬁrst parameter is themateriality of associational beneﬁts. It clariﬁes the na-
ture of beneﬁts offered to members—and withheld from those excluded—and al-
lows a determination about which of them can be decoupled from full membership
for possible partial redistribution. With respect to their materiality, associational
goods can include immaterial beneﬁts, quasi-material advantages, and concretely
material opportunities.
Immaterial goods can be further distinguished into general and association-
speciﬁc beneﬁts. General immaterial beneﬁts describe goods that membership in
presumably any association can bring: a sense of inclusion, belonging, social con-
nectedness, and, as some scholars argue, the basis for self-respect.58 These important
but elusive advantages of association often depend to a large degree on the quality of
personal relations within the group. They thus arguably presuppose a degree of ex-
clusiveness, as relations are often closer withinmore selective groups. Speciﬁc imma-
terial beneﬁts are intangible opportunities that may come with inclusion in clubs,
like access to networks, information, connections, and recommendations. Other
prospects might arise because of membership in a prestigious association. Not all
groups provide these advantages equally, and their exact nature is particular to the
association. Some of these beneﬁts may depend on genuine acceptance and personal
relations within a club, as other members must offer recommendations, introduc-
tions, business deals etc., and thus they often do not accrue equally even to accepted
members. Even the more standardized immaterial beneﬁts deriving, say, from hav-
ing access to alumni connections or an old boy network arguably depend on mem-
bers’willingness to share with other members and therefore the association’s ability
to select membership. A forced opening could cause discrimination to simply go
underground as the group label no longer holds the same meaning for those op-
posed to the newmembers.59 Redistribution of both general and speciﬁc immaterial
goods is difﬁcult, and it is impossible to decouple them from membership. Claims
for access to these beneﬁts, thus, should be understood and scrutinized as demands
for full inclusion.
Associations may also offer a number of quasi-material goods to their members,
which can have a direct impact on members’ educational and socio-economic op-
portunities outside of the association in question, facilitating members’ ability to
realize their life chances and commitments. Such quasi-material goods comprise
beneﬁts that are still nonmaterial but already more tangible, like the acquisition
and development of skills, social and otherwise, that might stem concretely from
58. For example, see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 386–88 (see note 11 above).
59. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, 170 (see note 14 above).
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participation in classes and workshops. Finally, there is a wide range of outright
material goods that come with membership in clubs, such as the right of use of fa-
cilities, access to services, and, crucially, eligibility for jobs in and even outside the
organization.While immaterial opportunities cannot be decoupled from full mem-
bership, both quasi-material and material goods potentially can.
Once an association’s range of goods is established, two further parameters—
availability and valence—fully establish the nature of harm done to those excluded
and the degree of intrusion that may be warranted to balance both liberty and
equality interests.
Goods offered by associations are exclusive to varying degrees. Their availability
is determined on the one hand by their level of uniqueness. Some goods will be ex-
clusively provided by one association, as was the case for the “incomparable mili-
tary college,” the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), which offered an “adversative
method” of instruction to its all-male student body. This didactic model was de-
signed to allow the students a “heightened comprehension of their capacity to deal
with duress and stress” and was an educational opportunity that was not available
to women anywhere in the United States.60 Even for goods that are not unique per
se, their availability can depend on and vary with context: Some material or quasi-
material goodsmay be readily available in one setting, such as access to associational
ﬁlm or book collections, workshops, or skill training that in an urban context can
easily be obtained through membership in other associations, or provided by li-
braries or other service facilities in the same city. In rural areas, the same good
may be hard to come by, and exclusion from membership in associations that do
provide it may amount to exclusion from the use of this good tout court. Con-
nected to the consideration of the degree of uniqueness, then, is the assessment of
whether similar goods are accessible to the excluded from other sources, and if so,
crucially, whether at a comparable price in terms of distance, cost, and ease of ac-
cess. Understanding whether a withheld good may be available elsewhere allows a
better determination of how the economic opportunity interests in particular are
harmed by exclusion.
The third parameter to be taken into account when assessing the relative value
and impact of an associational good, and thus the harm caused by exclusion, is its
valence. The range of goods offered by associations, from immaterial tomaterial ad-
60. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), 519–20. The example is only partially rel-
evant in this context in the sense that VMI is a government-funded institution, not a private
voluntary association. Nevertheless, it is an instructive illustration of a unique good that dis-
criminatory membership policies might withhold from non-members.
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vantages, can have some degree of purchase outside of the association, enhancing
their value beyond their immediate beneﬁt. For instance, Koppelman notes how
membership in the Boy Scouts of America, and especially prestigious ranks such
as “Eagle Scout,” are connoted positively even outside the organization and might
lead to more opportunities in other contexts as well.61 This speaks to the good so-
cietal standing of the Boy Scouts and makes membership especially attractive, as it
offers advantages that other comparable associations of a smaller size and inﬂu-
ence may not be able to reproduce, despite the similarity of the associational goods
they offer in other respects. Assessing the valence of an associational good in other
contexts thus allows a better determination of the impact that exclusion has on the
economic opportunity interests, the community participation interests, and with
them the integrity interests of those discriminated against.
In order to classify the nature and value of the goods at stake in membership
conﬂicts, courts should rely on testimony of relevant witnesses (for instance the
hiring practices of big local employers and the role that membership in the con-
tested association plays for success in being hired); on expert witness assessments
of the exact nature of the various goods a secondary voluntary association offers,
their availability from others sources, and their valence in other contexts; and on
statistical inquiry into the relationship between these goods and social and eco-
nomic success of club members.
Taken together, these parameters allow us to classify associational goods and
understand better their impact on life chances. All of these goods are of course
desirable and can have bearing on one’s economic, social, and even political op-
portunities. However, with a better idea of the extent of the harm done by exclu-
sion from respective beneﬁts, it is possible to determine whether access to speciﬁc
goods, rather than compelled full membership, can already achieve offsetting this
harm to a satisfactory degree.
When Should Full Membership be Compelled?
The goods approach does not exempt any kind of private voluntary group on
principle, even expressive associations with clear messages that would currently
be completely shielded because of their importance for expressive freedom and
democratic dissent. Therefore, it is important not to neglect the liberty interest at
stake. While full inclusion and acceptance is of course the ultimate goal of anti-
discrimination efforts, redistributing fullmembership should be the exception rather
than the norm, due to its centrality for associational voice and the importance of
61. Koppelman, “Should Noncommercial Associations,” 49 (see note 52 above).
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associations for insuring the possibility of sustainable democratic dissent. Since
membership should be a good that is more protected than others, when would
the goods approach allow for a forced opening of associations? Such a decision
should be based on the harms to material, community participation, and integrity
interests of those excluded, operationalized with the help of the elaborated param-
eters. In this calculation the special needs and claims of children should also be
taken into account.
Harms to Integrity and Community Participation Interests. Compelling full mem-
bership on the basis of harms to community participation and integrity interests
is based on the idea that exclusion can ultimately represent, and even lead to the
perpetuation of, second-class citizenship. Functioning like a stigma, the exclusion
of certain categories of persons signiﬁes civic inferiority and can cause loss of self-
respect in those excluded, a concern that is of course most acute when the dis-
crimination targets traditionally un(der)privileged groups.62 The gravity of the
“number of serious social and personal harms”63 that can derive from this kind
of invidious discrimination explains the current dichotomous practice that en-
forces full inclusion if anti-discrimination interests are found to be strong enough.
In order to decide when membership itself is the good to be redistributed and
thus forcing full inclusion is warranted, several aspects should be taken into con-
sideration. First, arguably not all exclusion signals intentional discrimination or
perpetuates existing advantage structures.64 Separatism, as opposed to discrimina-
tion, is conceivable. Some membership restrictions might be said to make no
statement about the groups excluded, but only about the nature of the accepted
members. Examples of such non-malicious separatism could be self-help groups,
fraternities and sororities, ethnic or cultural clubs, or other groups that intend to
foster feelings of some speciﬁed identity, be it brother- or sisterhood, or other shared
outlooks or life situations. Nancy Rosenblum therefore warns of supposing con-
gruence, meaning that exclusionary practices within associations should not be
assumed to have a negative impact on dispositions and behavioral patterns in other
62. For example, see Robin Lenhardt, “Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality
in Context,” New York University Law Review 79 (2004): 803–931; Ilan H. Meyer, “Minority
Stress and Mental Health in Gay Men,” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 36 (March
1995): 38–56; Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1963).
63. Roberts, 625 (see note 5 above).
64. For a taxonomy of different types of discrimination, see Kaspar Lippert-Rasmussen,
“The Badness of Discrimination,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2006): 167–85.
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contexts as well. On the congruence view, members of all-male clubs are expected to
discriminate against women also in the economic or civic spheres, and so on.65 If
there can be separation for non-malicious purposes, this kind of exclusion would
not in itself represent, nor cause, second-class citizenship of those excluded. Here,
only the more material goods that might be withheld from the denied groups could
contribute to inferior civic standing and prospects. While acceptance into clubs cel-
ebrating a speciﬁc identity might be very desirable for those that have no access, if
those goods relevant for their civic equality were made accessible—potentially
through decoupling—these groups’ voices would not need to be forcibly altered. Full
membership regulation in these cases should be of only a limited nature, because it
tends to harm the good that regulation is supposed to distribute more evenly: the
sense of belonging and acceptance. Second, historically disadvantaged groupsmight
wish to discriminate against members of majority groups, and the effects of this dis-
criminationwouldmost likely not undermine equal public standing of the excluded,
especially if potentially relevant goods could be decoupled.66 Third, and most con-
troversially, even outright discrimination against non-majority groups might war-
rant protection if we take seriously the role of dissent in liberal democracy.
Appraising whether membership policies should be shielded necessitates an
analysis of the standing and inﬂuence of an association: is membership itself of
such valence in other contexts that categorical exclusion ostracizes those who are
left out? Otherwise, allowing even outright discriminatory intent against also oth-
erwise disadvantaged groups might be exactly what a defense of democratic dis-
sent entails. In Roberts, the majority of the Court deemed that exclusion from full
membership in the Jaycees did denote and reinforce systemic discrimination and
thus inferior public standing. Relegation to associate membership status reﬂected
the “stigmatizing injury” that discrimination on the basis of sex generally caused
women.67 The Court regarded the Jaycees as inﬂuential enough to be akin to a
place of public accommodation, an appraisal that has been contested.68 From the
goods perspective, most likely it depends on the locations of individual chapters—
in urban contexts, alternative associations with similar economic and social inﬂuence
and open membership policies exist. In rural areas, with a less lively associational
65. See Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, 36–41 (see note 14 above).
66. For a discussion of this point, proposing that separation by minority groups could be
tolerated, when separatism of majority groups would not be, see “Freedom of Association,” 384–
85 (see note 56 above).
67. Roberts, 625 (see note 5 above).
68. For example, see Kateb, “The Value of Association,” 58–59 (see note 9 above); Rosen-
blum, Membership and Morals, 171 (see note 14 above).
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sphere, national organizations like the Jaycees may have very little competition and
signiﬁcantly outperform local alternatives in terms of material means and community
impact. If they play a signiﬁcant role in the community practices of their environment,
full membership might have to be opened to spare those excluded the continuing rel-
egation to the status of secondary community members.
The adult, openly gay assistant scoutmaster in Dale would remain excludable
under the goods approach as such leadership positions are linked to expressing
and inculcating the associational voice and cannot be decoupled from full mem-
bership. Already able to garner advantages from the status associated with the ranks
of Eagle Scout and other inner-organizational distinctions that would be open to
Dale as a youth (see the next section for a discussion why), the inability to serve
as scoutmaster would likely not harm his economic opportunity interests. Simi-
larly, while his categorical exclusion clearly denoted discriminatory intent, with re-
spect to availability and valence the question would be whether adult voluntary in-
volvement in the Boy Scouts rather than other similar organizations is so pervasive
a practice that exclusion from it amounts to exclusion from an important pillar of
the public life of the wider community, and thus signiﬁcantly harms community
participation and integrity interests. Short of such harm, the associational freedom
to express meaningful dissent even with important egalitarian values is crucial in
order to allow for a diverse and generative associational sphere.
Conversely, the Court’s unanimous decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay
Group of Boston to allow the organizers of the popular and widely attended annual
St. Patrick’s Day–Evacuation Day Parade in Boston to exclude the Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston from marching under their own ban-
ner may have been decided differently under the goods approach.69 The same goes
for N.Y. Cty. Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, which allowed the long-
standing private sponsor of New York’s St. Patrick’s Day Parade to exclude the
Irish Lesbian and Gay Organization from marching under a separate banner af-
ﬁrming their identity.70 Both parades’ organizers successfully refused allowing sep-
arate banners on the grounds that these would violate their ﬁrst amendment right
not to afﬁrm those groups’ identity.71 These parades are of time-honored tradition
69. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
70. N.Y. Cty. Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F.Supp 358 (1993).
71. In fact, both cases were decided on freedom of speech grounds, with only secondary ref-
erence to expressive association; see Hurley, at 572–81 (see note 69 above); see also Hiberians,
366–67, 368 (see previous note). Nevertheless it is an interesting case from the perspective of the
goods approach, and the fact that lower courts had in both cases deemed the parades to be more
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and present themselves as widely inclusive community celebrations that attract
thousands of participants, spectators, and viewers on television. Lower-level courts
in both cases had therefore found the events to be akin to places of public accom-
modation and thus governed by anti-discrimination law. The Supreme Court and
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York disagreed and pro-
tected the parades as speech. From a goods perspective, themost pertinent question
is whether the community participation interest of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual
(LGB) groups was so gravely harmed by the exclusion that intervention would
be warranted. Both parades allowed members of these groups to participate indi-
vidually without a speciﬁc LGB banner; however, almost no other group was ex-
cluded frommarching under their own sign, no written rules existed, nor was there
a discernible expressive criterion uniting participants other than the participation
in this “civic celebration” itself.72 With respect to availability, then, the good of par-
ticipation in such a prominent community event is difﬁcult to replicate elsewhere,
considering the size, tradition, and publicity of both parades. As the annual celebra-
tion of Irish-American identity and pride, the valence of marching with a banner
in either parade is equally considerable. Exclusion from the opportunity to par-
ticipate in a central communal event on the same terms as other citizens clearly
harms community participation interests. Given the value of the good withheld
and the fact that it cannot be decoupled from full participation, there is thus a
strong argument to be made for compelling inclusion of the LGB groups in the
parades under the goods approach.
The Special Status of Children. Changing our perspective to a goods-based ap-
proach would also allow us to consider better the special situation of children in
the associational sphere and how exclusion may affect their interests differently
from those of adults. The rights of children are not simply reducible to those of
adults, and the duties of protection and care they confer not only to their parents
akin to places of public accommodation and applied the principles of Roberts reveals the inter-
pretative latitude with respect to proper classiﬁcation.
72. Hibernians, 369, 363, citing a Massachusetts Superior Court with reference to the Bos-
ton parade, (see previous note). Also, describing the New York Parade: “. . . anyone who has
watched the St. Patrick’s Day Parade can attest to the fact that not everyone in the Parade is
Irish, although at times it has been said that on St. Patrick’s day, everyone in New York is Irish.
The Parade marchers generally number in the vicinity of 150,000, with between one and two
million on-lookers. The New York St. Patrick’s Day Parade is carried by at least one local tele-
vision station and quite often parts of it are shown on national television. The St. Patrick’s Day
Parade is billed as the largest annual civilian Parade in the world,” (ibid., 361). A similar point is
made in Hurley, 562, citing the state trial court (see note 69 above).
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but also to the liberal state should lead us to scrutinize exclusionary membership
policies of children’s associations (e.g., boy/girl scouts, sport and cultural clubs, sum-
mer camps), or mixed groups that have also child membership, differently. How-
ever, neither variant of the two existing accounts of expressive exclusion makes al-
lowance for the particular needs that childrenmay have in the associational sphere,
treating clubs of adults and those geared towards non-adults the same.73
While they are certainly rights-holders qua being human, due to their depen-
dence on others, children are precluded from holding certain rights that adult cit-
izens in a liberal democracy enjoy and have special interests that impose duties
on direct caregivers and the liberal state. The most salient special right in the con-
text of freedom of association is the “right to an open future,”74 a term coined by
Joel Feinberg, which entails that given children’s status as “becomings”75 rather
than grown beings, the liberal state has a duty to defend their “anticipatory au-
tonomy rights” and arguably also the future welfare interests of the child.76 Next
to the obvious economic opportunity interest of being able to partake in activities
that train skills and offer educational prospects, this right to an open future also
has a psychological component owing to children’s greater vulnerability to the psy-
chological harm of exclusion.77 The experience of exclusion and rejection may have
a stronger impact on the present and future community participation and integrity
interests of children than those of adults, necessitating special care.
The vital good to be redistributed with respect to children will then in most
cases be full membership, rather than material opportunities that could be decou-
pled. For associations that are primarily geared towards children, this means that
the clubs cannot discriminate on the basis of suspect classiﬁcations. Separatism
may be acceptable, if comparable goods are also available for those groups of chil-
dren that are excluded. Exclusion with discriminatory intent, however, would call
for compelled membership. Thus, restrictive all-girl or all-boy groups, for instance,
73. Shiffrin similarly argues that freedom of association, as other constitutional rights, have
to apply differently to children as not yet fully autonomous agents, in “What’s Really Wrong,”
880–88 (see note 31 above).
74. Joel Feinberg, “The Child’s Right to an Open Future,” in Freedom and Fulﬁllment
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 76–97.
75. Barbara Arneil, “Becoming versus Being: A Critical Analysis of the Child in Liberal The-
ory,” in The Moral and Political Status of Children, ed. David Archard and Colin Macleod (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 70–94, at 70.
76. Feinberg, “The Child’s Right,” 77 (see note 74 above).
77. For a discussion of the effect of social exclusion on children, see Melanie Killen and
Adam Rutland, Children and Social Exclusion: Morality, Prejudice, and Group Identity (Malden,
Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
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could be acceptable only if comparable opportunities were available elsewhere
also for girls/boys and if the case could be reasonably made that the separatism
is not meant as a statement against the abilities of the excluded group, but for
logistical or other practical purposes, or to celebrate membership rather than to ex-
press disdain. If mixed groups target children but mostly adults, a separate cate-
gory must be opened for children versus adult members, with discriminatory
practices only tolerated for the latter kind.
The egalitarian interests at stake in guaranteeing a fairly equal starting point to
children of different backgrounds in this case trumps associational claims to be free
to discriminate. Given that associations will still be able to differentiate in adult
membership if they so wish, and are free to open up a special category of mem-
bership for children if they have not done so to begin with, the associational in-
terest in living its voice is still appropriately taken into account. Despite the fact
that parents may have interests in teaching their children that discriminating
against a certain societal group is desirable, the liberal state has a rival duty to
ensure these children’s right to an open future.78 Parental interests in ideological
inculcation are still properly allowed for, since the associational sphere is not the
only, nor necessarily the primary, venue for parents to instill their values in their
children. That children’s organizations cannot discriminate in their membership
is warranted by the crucial interests at stake in guaranteeing equal protection of the
possibility to ﬂourish. The goods approach thus allows us to take into account that
associations may have to be treated differently on the same principle when we deal
with the rights and interests of children.
The Court’s decision in Dale then would have been considerably more nu-
anced under the goods approach: In view of the Boy Scouts’ near-monopoly sta-
tus with respect to its importance, prestige, inﬂuence, and relationship to the state,
the claim that its goods cannot be had elsewhere was particularly strong, despite
the existence of other youth organizations that organize similar activities.79 More
importantly, the fact that discrimination was intended not only to target adults,
78. For example, see Allen Buchanan, “Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology,” Phi-
losophy and Public Affairs (2004): 95–130, for a description of the “moral and prudential risks to
which we are all vulnerable by virtue of our ineliminable social epistemic dependency” (99) and
that discriminatory children’s associations particularly embody.
79. For an overview of the monopoly-like place that the Boy Scouts hold in American so-
ciety—for instance the explicit exemption from a federal statute prohibiting civilians from wear-
ing uniforms similar to those used by the military, or the widespread knowledge and esteem of
its ranks, such as that of Eagle Scout, well beyond the organization—see Koppelman, “Should
Noncommercial Associations,” 47–49 (see note 52 above).
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but also children and youths, makes this exclusion exceptionally serious. Instead
of wholesale protecting the Boy Scouts’ rather shaky message of opposition to ho-
mosexuality, a goods approach would draw a distinction between the harm of ex-
clusion from youth membership and that from adult leadership positions. It would
compel full membership for Scout youths in the interest of granting children equal
access to important goods and of insuring their self-understanding as future full
members of society. Unlike the Dale interpretation of Brennan’s nexus test, no
sweeping right to discriminate against gays could have been granted on the basis
of the purported message. Adjudicating membership conﬂicts from a goods-based
perspective provides us with crucial conceptual resources to better take into con-
sideration the special status of children with respect to their rights in the associa-
tional sphere.
Protecting Economic Opportunity Interests: Full Membership
versus Decoupling
As should be clear by now, the goods approach does allow compelling full mem-
bership if crucial anti-discrimination goals cannot be achieved by lesser degrees
of intervention. However, full membership (and with it, presumably, access to the
more elusive goods) should be forcibly opened only in cases in which exclusion
from them causes or perpetuates harm to equal public standing as measured by
impact on economic, participatory opportunity, and integrity interests of those
excluded. The intuition is that quasi-material and material goods can be regulated
much more than currently practiced, by decoupling access to these goods from
full membership and opening them to excluded groups. This holds even when deal-
ing with expressive associations that propose a clear message. To show this, I will
ﬁrst discuss when even material and quasi-material goods may require forced in-
tegration, and then elaborate the logic of decoupling and how it might change the
calculus in many associational membership cases.
Material effects. As discussed, material and quasi-material goods can differ greatly
in their availability and valence. Depending on the reach of an association, its po-
sition within the public sphere, and its inﬂuence on the economic and social mar-
ket, decoupling its material goods may not be enough to offset the disadvantage
that a group suffers from being excluded from membership. Here, a further dis-
cussion of the case of the forced integration of the Virginia Military Institute can
serve as illustration of the logic of the goods approach. The Supreme Court or-
dered the all-male military institution to integrate women, because Virginia’s
belated attempt to create an alternative institution for women was deemed unsat-
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isfactory.80 Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership failed in “myriad respects
other than military training, [to] qualify as VMI’s equal,”81 and was only “a ‘pale
shadow’ of VMI in terms of the range of curricular choices and faculty stature,
funding, prestige, alumni support and inﬂuence.”82 The court deemed that only
if women had had access to a “position they would have occupied in the absence
of [discrimination],” would the continuation of the all-male institution have been
acceptable.83 The most important good that VMI offered in terms of economic op-
portunity interests, its particular pedagogical approach and reputation as the
“most challenging military school in the United States,” could not be decoupled
from full membership since the success of the valued “adversative method” de-
pended on a comprehensive immersion into the particular way of life created at
the Institute. The training employed at VMI was also not available elsewhere, as
the alternatively opened institution failed to create a comparable good—it offered
a “cooperative method of education which reinforces self-esteem” as a substitute,
and set it up with only a fraction of the funding and quality of faculty, making it
unlikely that the new institution could ever match an education received at the
VMI in valence.84 Denying women access to a unique and important formative op-
portunity represented a discernible harm to their economic opportunity interests,
and with no option of decoupling, forced integration would also be warranted from
a goods-based perspective. Since for groups in the associational sphere, unlike for
the state of Virginia, it will be difﬁcult to provide alternative venues to offer the
same goods, membership will more often be compelled when the context of the as-
sociation is meager in opportunities and the good offered cannot be reasonably de-
coupled. Another instructive case to illustrate the use of parameters in the goods
approach in this context is that of Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, in
which the single-sex university was forced to accept a male nursing student, because
a comparable education would have only been available over 100 miles away.85
80. A lower court had directed Virginia to remedy the discriminatory treatment, by either
admitting women to VMI, establishing a comparable institution for women, or abandoning
state support of the institution, leaving it free to pursue its discriminatory policy as a private
institution. Of course, according to the goods approach, this last option would not necessarily
have remedied the situation.
81. United States v. Virginia, 551 (see note 60 above).
82. Ibid., 553, citing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s decision in the same
case, United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (1995), at 1250 (James Dickinson
Phillips, Jr., dissenting).
83. Ibid., 547, citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, at 280 (1971).
84. Ibid., 548.
85. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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This reﬂection helps us reconsider the nexus test that the Court performed
in Roberts from the perspective of economic opportunity interests harmed. One
prong of its inquiry should have been whether the exclusion suffered by women
as associate members rather than full members did in fact translate into dimin-
ished economic opportunities outside the association. Women had access to al-
most all opportunities offered by the Jaycees, with the exception of holding voting
rights, being eligible for local or national ofﬁce, and participating in certain asso-
ciational awards programs and leadership training.86 Were leadership positions
within the organization in fact so prestigious even outside the club that they trans-
lated into improved job chances or communal inﬂuence? Did leadership training
and awards programs bestow skills that were not available elsewhere also in terms
of valence at a comparable price? The fact that in the controversial chapters women
had been accepted as full members for a decade by the time of the judgment could
have helped with informing this inquiry, allowing the Court to gauge the effects
on economic opportunity interests for full members versus associate members. If
in fact the opportunities attached to these withheld goods did signiﬁcantly impact
women’s economic opportunity interests, under the goods approach a further in-
quiry would have been whether the harm inﬂicted could have been sufﬁciently mit-
igated by decoupling some of these goods. Relevant leadership training programs
and maybe even relevant awards programs could have been opened to associate
members as well, or equivalent skill and accreditation opportunities could have
been created to allow women to access the same prospects as male members. An
investigation into the material opportunities conferred by membership through
the lens of the goods approach would thus have offered a better understanding of
the harm inﬂicted and a broader spectrum of possible remedies.
Decoupling. One of the main advantages of the goods approach would thus be
that with the option of decoupling, courts gain a new instrument to alleviate harms
to equal citizenship while protecting associational freedom and dissent. To clarify
the logic of decoupling further, imagine a sports club in a relatively rural area whose
membership is restricted to wealthy, white businessmen. The use of well-kept fa-
cilities, access to sports classes, and access to jobs within the association are restricted
to white men due to the club’s explicit message of support for traditional gender
roles and the superiority of the white race. Under the message approach, this exclu-
sionmight be protected, depending onwhether courts apply the nexus test critically
86. Roberts, 613 (see note 5 above).
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as Brennan did in Roberts, scrutinizing the plausibility of a nexus between sports
and an ideological message, or deferentially as Rehnquist did in Dale, bowing to
the club’s own perception of this link between activity, ideological convictions,
and membership restrictions. Given the dichotomous choice between either forced
inclusion or protection of the discriminatory practice, liberty interests of the patri-
archal supremacists and the equality interests of those excluded are put in strong
competition. Under the goods approach, however, courts could adjudicate in a
manner that protects the purportedmessage and claimed freedom to associate with
whom one chooses, while allowing those discriminated against access to many
goods without full inclusion. Redistributable goods might be the opportunity to ac-
quire or train certain skills, with the club forced tomake access to facilities or classes
available within parameters decided by the court. A similar rationale would hold
with respect to participation in workshops, lessons, access to libraries, professional
lectures or other services of other clubs that are currently beyond the scope of re-
distribution short of compelled membership. Most immediately relevant to civic
equality is whether some of the jobs offered within the setting of the association
would have to be opened as well to groups the club otherwise discriminates against.
Exempting jobs that are tied to the expressive activities of the club, such as spokes-
person, general manager, or other leadership and expressive positions, other posts
could be considered for decoupling, opening them to non-members. Dale Carpen-
ter suggested something similar when he proposed tomodify O’Connor’s approach
by adding as a third category what he called quasi-expressive associations, such as
private schools, media outlets, and certain large private associations, whose non-
expressive activities should be regulated while their expressive activities should be
protected.87 Instead of limiting this procedure to an in-between category of quasi-
expressive associations, the goods approach suggests applying it to the entire ﬁeld
of private voluntary associations. Rather than either forcing full membership or
protecting message, it suggests decoupling access to contentious goods frommem-
bership, where possible, and thereby preserving associational voice better than the
current approach.
The goods approach then promises to perform better with respect to the two
failings of both the current message approach and the alternative primary nature
account. First, by tracking more closely what harm exclusion inﬂicts on those dis-
87. Carpenter, “Expressive Association,” 1576–87 (see note 36 above). The case he examines
is Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), in which a segregated private school was forced to
accept black students on the grounds that this would not distort the association’s racist message;
compelling schools to employ black teachers would.
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criminated against, and introducing the decoupling of goods from membership
as a regulation option, the goods approach allows for a more nuanced balance be-
tween the competing interests involved that avoids dichotomously under- or over-
protecting associational expression. Second, democratic dissent is more reliably
protected because it is no longer associational message—or primarily expressive
activity—that determines protection from state intrusion in membership policies.
By focusing on redistributing goods rather than the reason for exclusion, the goods
approach does not scrutinize the validity or rationality of contested exclusion; there
has to be no previous message that declares or implies the necessity of discrimina-
tion. The claim to restrict membership at the time of litigation is taken as proof of
an existing intention to deviate from majoritarian equality norms.88 In this way,
adjudicating from a goods-based perspective protects voice more reliably and al-
lows for a dynamic process of opinion and message creation and evolution.
Of course, as in the conventional approaches, courts’ assessments of the facts
of a case matter: Whether or not the goods conferred by membership are of rel-
evance for civic equality has to be established by a factual inquiry that always calls
for an appraisal that can never be entirely objective or predetermined. However,
as O’Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion in Roberts, not only is such
the task of judges and courts; in the complex ﬁeld of associational life there seems
to be no simple rule that could turn the muddled waters into clear-cut cases. As
the goods perspective allows courts to distinguish between the different interests
involved and to operationalize them with the help of the elaborated parameters,
these assessments are made transparent and traceable. Relying on a fundamentally
different idea of balance, the goods approach furthermore moves away from the
zero-sum logic of expressive exclusion, seeking instead equitable reconciliation be-
tween liberty and equality interests where possible. With decoupling a viable mid-
dle option for regulation, in many cases we therefore avoid the risk of either harm-
ful intrusion into the formation and vocalization of vital democratic dissent, or a
neglect of claims of fair access. In that sense, less is at stake in terms of the gravity
of legal assessments.
Some might argue that the goods-based treatment of associations could trans-
late into a punishment of “successful” clubs because only those that offer substan-
88. From a perspective of wanting to foster democratic disagreement and enabling expres-
sive opposition, it is in fact absurd to oblige valid dissent to have been uttered clearly and veri-
ﬁably in the past in order to merit protection. The fact of ongoing and potentially costly litiga-
tion should be seen as a sign that, at least now, the association must feel strongly enough about
the exclusion to want to invest in its defense.
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tial goods to their members would be singled out for intervention.89 While this
observation rings true, the intervention into successful clubs and thus differential
treatment of similar clubs is nevertheless warranted by egalitarian concerns, for
otherwise the equality claims of democratic society cannot properly be taken into
account. If we are to protect dissent and enable rough statements of rejection and
exclusion in the civil sphere, we also have to ensure that all participants are fairly
equally equipped with the necessary goods to pursue their respective conceptions
of the good and to contribute to this contentious pluralist debate. Only then the
much-desired ﬂuid pluralism can develop, to offset individual rejection, multiply
opportunities for expression, and invigorate a lively, multi-vocal democratic dis-
cussion. In this sense, then, because of the possibility of decoupling, the goods
approach promises to contribute more to bringing about this ﬂuid pluralism than
the current practice does.
Conclusion
Concerning material opportunities the goods approach goes much further in pro-
tecting egalitarian considerations than either the message or primary nature ap-
proaches, as no group is completely shielded from potential intervention. Even
in a culture of pervasive prejudice and strong discriminatory messages, important
goods would be available to those that associations wished to exclude. This possi-
bility of intervention signals to associations that they cannot completely opt out of
the larger society’s struggle to ensure equal rights for all citizens. It does so, how-
ever, without excessively curtailing associational expression, because even if inter-
vention occurs, in the majority of cases relevant goods will be decoupled from
membership, rather than the association being forced to accept unwanted groups
of new members. This protection is allowed even without a strong message of dis-
criminatory content, and thus serves to protect associational voice rather than con-
crete message. Furthermore, litigation about access to these goods would have the
same signaling effects that the message approach currently has, sparking public de-
bate, reaction from members, and, possibly, push for more inclusive policies from
inside the organization. Given the possibility of intervention for all groups, an in-
centive would moreover be created for clubs to use the option to make contested
89. Douglas Linder made this observation in 1984 with respect to Brennan’s focus on the
state’s interest in ending discrimination; however, the criticism can be applied to the goods-
based approach as well. See Douglas Linder, “Freedom of Association after Roberts v. United
States Jaycees,” Michigan Law Review 82 (1984): 1878–1903, at 1890.
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goods available for non-members in order to avoid legal challenge. Thus, the im-
portant state goal of ensuring equal citizenship conditions can be more effectively
pursued without curtailing associational freedom to voice opposition to majority
norms.
Considering the persistent condition of pluralism in Western liberal democra-
cies, it is crucial to ﬁnd the right balance between, on the one hand, preserving the
liberty to associate with whom we choose (and to voice and live accordingly to the
ethical principles we adhere to), and, on the other hand, guaranteeing a sufﬁcient
set of opportunities to realize these freedoms for all citizens in the ﬁrst place. Many
promises of liberal democracy depend on the liberal state’s capacity to ensure equal
access to fundamental goods, not least the meaningful possibility of exit from
society’s subcultures to a common, shared citizen space. If crucial goods are with-
held from groups of citizens because of discrimination, their access to civic culture
and thus ﬂuid pluralism is hindered. Taking a goods perspective avoids the stark
dichotomy between extensive protection and compelled membership, and thus
promises to better safeguard both equality and liberty interests at stake.
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